This paper looks at the role of policy in the creation of three biotechnology clusters on the east coast of China. Policies -both in the creation of background and emergence conditions and those targeted specifically towards fostering biotechnology clusters -have been highly influential in stimulating the growth of three clusters around Beijing, around Shanghai and out of Shenzhen. We put together a database of biotechnology companies and research centres from a variety of sources, examining the various characteristics of these clusters; and we conducted a series of semi-structured interviews to understand the motivations for start-ups and the role of policy in this process.
These clusters have distinct characteristics and policy has interacted with other factors in different ways in the three areas. The two main drivers of this cluster creation in all three areas have been the role of 'returnees' -scientists and entrepreneurs having trained and worked in developed countries returning to found start-up or spin-off companies, lured by growth in the area and by the slew of policies designed to attract them. And institutional reform has been a key driving factor, which has proceeded at varying paces in our three areas. It is not clear that the more directive policies specifically to create a cluster in the NSBPIB science park near Shanghai have been successful, with firms being excessively technology driven and retaining a Plan mentality. The cluster around Shenzhen by contrast shows more evidence of market mechanisms. Finding a balance between creating underlying initial conditions, and institutional reform that liberalizes and withdraws state influence, is a critical one that is evolving in the Chinese high technology sectors.
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Non-Technical Abstract
This paper looks at the role of policy in the creation of three biotechnology clusters on the east coast of China. Policies -both in the creation of background and emergence conditions and those targeted specifically towards fostering biotechnology clusters -have been highly influential in stimulating the growth of three clusters around Beijing, around Shanghai and out of Shenzhen.
We use a structural framework developed in Avnimelech and Teubal (2004) to categorise the types of policy phases that China has gone through, with emphasis here on the first two phases focusing on the creation of background and emergence conditions, and the coevolution of institutions alongside the encouragement of start-ups. We also look at the policies directed specifically to creating competences and activities in biotechnology, and at the underlying skill base and cost of technically trained labour in this area.
We put together a database of biotechnology companies and research centres from a variety of sources, examining the various characteristics of these clusters; and we conducted a series of semi-structured interviews to understand the motivations for start-ups and the role of policy in this process. The database establishes the existence of three distinct clusters of firms, located close to research centres and universities around Beijing and Shanghai and around the commercial growth area around Shenzhen in Guangdong province. We look at the type of sectoral specialization of firms, their research intensity and their ownership type. Through the interviews we were able to examine in particular the relationship between the founders' motivations, the choice of location and what attracted them to that area. We give example stories of foundations of firms from each of our clusters. The role of 'returnees' -scientists and entrepreneurs, having trained and worked in developed countries returning to settle and use their skills in the setting up of start-ups or spin-offs from research institutes or foreign companies -appears to be particularly significant, as does the extent of institutional reform and liberalization from state regulation.
We contrast the differing characteristics of our three clusters, in terms of research orientation, the strength of the industrial base and its hinterland, and the extent of institutional reform and decentralization and liberalization that has occurred in the different areas. In particular we look in some detail at the policies underlying the creation of the Shanghai biotechnology science park -the NSBPIB -and question whether such dirigiste policies have been successful in generating a market-oriented cluster. Research activities in the NSBPIB are criticized as being overly plan-oriented and too dependent on phase-released funding by the government, unable to keep pace with market developments. The cluster around Shenzhen, by contrast, shows more evidence of market mechanisms.
Finding a balance between creating underlying initial conditions supported by policies to stimulate resources, and attract scientists and entrepreneurial skills into the area, and institutional reform that liberalizes and allows greater autonomy for enterprises, withdrawing state influence, is a delicate one that is evolving in the Chinese high technology sectors.
INTRODUCTION
China has recently witnessed the emergence of a number of potentially important biotechnology clusters on the east coast. Notwithstanding that several of these agglomerations are in a very early stage, a pattern can be discerned where the most important clusters are centered around Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzen/Guangdong. The current, formative stage of the Chinese biotechnology industry implies that the coming decade(s) are likely to be characterized by continuing reorganization, reshuffling of factors of production and a shakeout of less competitive biotechnological sites.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of policies in propelling the emergence of biotechnology clusters. To build new institutions and reform existing ones simultaneously, alongside the introduction of policies that encourage greater entrepreneurship and risk-taking, is a highly complex task. The development of policies includes learning from previous institutional reforms (over the last 20 years), and providing a business friendly environment where ex-pats can resettle and find fertile ground for nurturing start-ups.
China, as a transitional economy, has been moving from planning to greater market orientation. Nevertheless, firms remain predominantly state owned especially for most large and medium-sized enterprises. Collective and privately owned firms are mostly smaller sized, and entry of new firms has been of these non-governmental types of enterprise.
The following section looks at science and technology policies in China and then focuses on those policies that are targeted specifically at developing biotechnology. Section 3 examines the structure of the biotechnology sector in China, emphasizing the three dominant biotechnology cluster regions on the east coast. Thereafter these three regions are compared in terms of size, knowledge base and specialization. The final section concludes.
TOWARDS A MARKET ORIENTED ECONOMY
The classification of different policy stages outlined in Avnimelech & Teubal's (2004) will serve as the structural framework for the analysis. Emphasis is on the first two phases. The first refers to the creation of background and pre-emergence conditions, while the subsequent phase features the co-evolution of institutions alongside start-ups. These stages characterise the transformation from a -by and large -entirely state-owned and state-run economy, to a reorientation towards the creation of start-ups and regional clusters in high-tech sectors.
The pre-emergence phase (1985 to 1995) included a strengthening of property rights, especially for science and technology enterprises, to allow for the creation of spin-offs from research institutes, universities and large enterprises and to encourage autonomy in decision-making for those enterprises. These are not private property rights as recognised in the West, but they do represent greater autonomy for the enterprise in terms of decisionmaking. This followed from 'The Decision on the Reform of the Science and Technology Regime' in 1985, by which the central government allowed the foundation of Minying Keji Enterprises (MKEs) which are non-traditional, but government-owned technology enterprises.
Most of these MKEs were spin-offs where the enterprise was set up by a group of scientists, primarily supported by research institutes and universities (Liu and White 2001; Lu and Lazonick 2003) . In 1988 establishment of MKEs was further encouraged ('Decision on the Further Reform of the Science and Technology Regime'), followed by a speech of Deng Xiaoping in 1992 which eliminated ideological obstacles to developing non-socialist ownership types and unleashed a boom in the creation of MKEs (Table 1) . Table 1 In the subsequent phase these policies were consistently pursued and resulted in a considerable increase in start-ups from the mid 1990s onwards. The numbers of MKEs The Torch programme, initiated in 1988, was set up to promote the commercialization of key high technology projects through market mechanisms. It directed development in certain industries, principally the electronics sector, but increasingly also the biotechnology sector. Part of its focus was also the creation of high technology industry development zones with the aim of assisting the application of R&D to production and commercialization.
In the ninth five year plan (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) , the Chinese government further stressed the importance of biotechnology R&D. At the same time, indigenous companies realized the importance that government was giving to this sector and became interested in biotechnology.
Local governments formulated similar policies supporting the development of their local biotechnology industry.
A high priority was also put on encouraging the return of Chinese scientists working abroad through, e.g. providing a favourable environment for returnees to set up their own businesses in specially designed "Returnee Parks". Since the Open Door policy was introduced in 1978, it is estimated that around 700,000 students went abroad to study, over 30 percent of whom were in the field of biotechnology or related areas (Qi C.Y. et al 2003) . and roughly a quarter has returned to work in China. These returnees make a significant contribution to the Chinese Academies of Science (Table 2) . Table 2 A key ingredient in the development of biotech clusters has been to secure a skill base in biotechnology, which has been strengthened since the mid 1980s. By a country ranking for all fields of science (Table 3) , sorted by papers, China was ranked 19 by citations in 2003, and ninth with respect to papers that has been cited. Table 3 China 
Figures 1 and 2

Characteristics of the dominant biotechnology clusters
The Beijing cluster contains the largest number of firm (177), followed by Shanghai (160) and Shenzen somewhat smaller (126). Most of the firms are small. Of the 53 percent of the sample that answered these questions, almost 66 percent employ fewer than 100 employees, and around a quarter of them were medium-sized firms (more than 100 but less than 500 employees).Very few firms were large enterprises.
Specialisation is dominated by the health, diagnostics and equipment sectors in all three clusters whereas the activity is relatively low in other sectors (agriculture, chemicals or services sectors). There is not a great difference between across clusters in terms of specialisation, even though the Shanghai cluster is the most specialized (health-and equipment sector) and also seems to be strongest when it comes to services (Table 5) . Table 5 The ownership patterns appear to show some differences between the three clusters. Beijing has a lower proportion of domestic privately owned enterprise than Shanghai and Shenzhen, and higher proportions of foreign-owned enterprises (where foreign owned includes both wholly owned and joint venture). This is due to the need for foreign firms in particular to be close to central government, in order to gain access to information on government plans and regulations, and also to take advantage of the greater R&D capacity in the Beijing area. Alongside this, the proportion of purely state-owned enterprises is lower in Beijing than in the other two locations (Table 7) . Table 7 It is noteworthy that in two of the clusters (Beijing and Shenzhen) most large companies are domestic, whereas the opposite pattern prevails in Shanghai. Small-and medium sized firms dominate, even in the foreign-owned part of the industry.
1 The biotechnology clusters are thus not dominated by large multinational companies (MNCs), but rather stems from entry into the clusters by indigenous firms.
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Founders and location
What these clusters all illustrate is a symbiotic relationship between the local government and firms, that has formed the backbone for the positive feedback that has existed between local government initiatives and entrepreneurial responses. As Qian (2003) Other new companies were founded by returning scientists from abroad.
Returning scientists have made their location choices depending on their previous residency, or where they went to university. Since most of these returning scientists started their studies in the leading universities, they tended to return to either Shanghai or Beijing. In addition, business. In other words access to technology was not an issue, whereas ease of bureaucracy, access to capital and the connections to enable the company to negotiate its way through government regulations were key factors.
Beijing, in contrast to Shenzhen, has developed as the science and technology research centre for China over the last twenty years. It has over 40% of national key laboratories in biotechnology, 25% of national engineering centres related to biotechnology and 15% of the country's biotechnology research organizations. A third of biotech research projects supported by the National Nature Science Fund were undertaken in Beijing and a half of the biotech research projects supported by the '863 plan' in 2002, well ahead of the other two locations as a research centre (see Table 10 ). Table 10 In addition Beijing, along with Shanghai, has a high concentration of top universities, compared with Shenzhen. (See Table 11 ) Table 11 There is some indication that the relative strength of biotech research in the Beijing and Shanghai areas is reflected in the types of firms that are created there. The
Shanghai and Beijing firms have higher research intensities, defined as numbers of R&D staff than firms in Guangdong (Table 6 ). One criticism meted against the NSPBIB in particular is that research has become overly 'plan' oriented, being dependent on phase-released funding by the government, and that such research is not as able to keep pace with market demand or market developments. The government has overly emphasised technological development at the expense of marketing or other support activities that would usually accompany the development of a cluster in a developed, more market-oriented country. There has been the development of some new technology platforms, on the back of returning scientists from the US, but without the required people in marketing and law. 7 An additional criticism of the NSBPIB, which can also be levied at all the biotech clusters, is the failure to allow firms to exit from the industry and for their resources to be absorbed or taken over by more efficient firms. This is particularly acute in the NSBPIB and leads to a lack of shaking out and restructuring which would enable the cluster to specialize and mature more efficiently. With firms not being allowed to fail, the risk-taking is borne by the state, which limits the development of market signals. If this degree of state involvement continues, this will stunt the growth and maturing of the cluster.
To summarise, there are some differences in terms of the role of government between our three emerging biotech clusters and also in their various structures and the types of firms that are settling there. The Beijing cluster, having a stronger research base than the other two, appears to attract more foreign firms than the other two clusters, perhaps in order to be close to central government and to enable foreign firms to establish networks necessary to get round the various regulatory procedures. It does appear that government involvement and direction into the biotech industry parks in particular in Beijing and Shanghai is very substantial and inhibiting to the development of true market responses. The Shenzhen area benefits from having a longer legacy of greater market orientation with its links to Hong Kong and the autonomy given to the Special Economic Zones, and there is more evidence of market forces operating in this cluster. However the Shenzhen area has no history of substantial research in the biotechnology field and is dependent on its manufacturing labour pool, whose lower costs are eroding as the area develops. There does not appear to be a great difference in terms of specialization between the three clusters, which is perhaps due to the relative immaturity of these clusters, although there are signs that the Shanghai cluster is developing greater diversity in terms of provision of services. Overall the Shanghai cluster, whilst having a highly dirigiste government involvement for instance in the resettling of research institutes into Pudong Park and other such forceful tactics, nevertheless has a more diversified industrial base as well as research skills in the area on which to build its cluster, and has a lighter regulatory touch than does the Beijing region. It therefore stands the greatest chance of developing into a more sophisticated and market-oriented cluster over the next decade.
CONCLUSIONS
The biotech clusters that we have described are the product of the interaction between various policy initiatives and a number of other factors. We have identified two main phases in the evolution of policy: From the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s when policies were mainly concerned with sowing the seeds of institutional reform, creating new forms of property rights, setting out strategic programmes for the development of biotechnology and other high technology sectors. This was followed from mid 1990s and onward by policies more focused on incentives to assist start-ups, on attracting potential entrepreneurs back to
China from abroad, and on developing regional clusters around science parks. These policies have been attempting to compensate for some of the immaturities and weaknesses in the Chinese economy: the lack of support for high risk ventures from the banking sector, the lack of venture capital and the relatively weak influence of foreign capital in this sector.
So can we argue that the Chinese government -both central and provincialpolicies have been successful in establishing these high-technology clusters? How much state involvement is necessary in a transition economy, to overcome the obstacles of inadequate property rights, poor rule of law and insufficient protection for private property from an overpowerful state? There are some indications that in various respects the Chinese state is managing their reform quite successfully, better than other transition states such as Russia for example, in allowing market mechanisms to infiltrate at the margin and to establish positive incentives for relationships between the state and private business (Lau et al 2000) . Thus considerable entry of new businesses does occur, which are for the most part private or collectively owned enterprises. In parallel, there is a restructuring and phasing out, and greater autonomy or spinning off of state-owned enterprises; and the price mechanism is being reinforced gradually from more marginal transactions to becoming the more prevalent allocative mechanism.
It nevertheless remains a policy-driven country -driven and responding to central planning and technology policies. This has its positive aspects with a beneficial relationship between provincial governments and entrepreneurs, encouraging start-ups and using fiscal incentives, for both government and firms, to assist in that process. There is considerable competition between provinces in trying to attract and stimulate business in their region which has a positive effect in bidding down entry barriers and in creating a race to lower the regulatory burden on firms.
The role of returnees in transferring their technical and managerial experience to all of these clusters in China has been crucial. Policy input has been significant as well in focusing on attracting entrepreneurial and scientific talent back to China from abroad, and a significant proportion of start-ups have been created by returnees. In terms of choice of location, they have been attracted by links to their previous universities (in Beijing or Shanghai) or by the greater ease of doing business, particularly in Shenzhen, but also in Shanghai. The proximity to central government has been a factor in locating near Beijing.
The role of institutional reform and greater openness has been particularly important in
Shenzhen. And the strong-arm of policy has been very significant in helping to construct the Shanghai cluster. The building up of the Zhangjiang High-tech Park is an example of powerful government being able to influence the relocation of major research institutes, and other institutions which in turn have stimulated the creation of start-ups there and the siting of international R&D company laboratories there.
However there are also negative aspects to this degree of state involvement in the genesis and shaping of the cluster. One criticism is that the strong-arm of government has been overly powerful in setting up these seeds for clustering and has been too influential on the types of activity that become established at these locations. This represents a reversion to a 'Plan mentality' where everyone goes by the rules, which affects the way that business is set up and transacted, responding to the letter to government incentives rather than seeking out market-driven initiatives which are responsive to customer demand or international standards. At the other extreme, foreign firms that have entered these locations have done so to exploit the incentives, bringing sometimes poor ideas and ventures to the market in order to make money. The real issue will be how quickly this industry and these clusters can adopt international standards, allowing shake-outs and exits of less productive firms to occur, enabling them to become integrated with the international market. Chinese professors are good clinicians but relatively weak on research management knowledge and skills. Venture capital is not yet knowledgeable enough to make good judgments along those lines, and the provincial governments inhibit closure of firms which would increase unemployment.
There is insufficient specialization between the clusters -in part due to competition between the regions, the composition of the clusters as yet does not fully reflect There are some threats to cluster development -at present they benefit from great cost advantages in comparison with the US or European high technology clusters.
However labour shortages have already developed in the Shenzhen area and wages have been rising accordingly. They need their own hinterland and diversification ie development of local supply skills as well as local markets to avoid being isolated coastal hubs, inferior in standards and not integrated yet into the international market, but not sufficiently developed or diversified to enable growth to occur in the more local adjacent regions. Only the Shanghai cluster at present shows signs of having this diversified hinterland and has the best chance of developing into a thicker, market-driven cluster.
There are signs that the Shenzhen region in developing the Greater Pearl River Delta Area is conscious of the need to extend further beyond its coastal hub into a deeper and more developed hinterland, through its 9+2 policy to link the nine provinces in southern China to the two special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau. Without this the cluster relies on being a cheaper manufacturing and export station, which advantages will be eroded by rising wage costs and shortages of labour skills. Note: Country counts are based on the institutional affiliations given on published papers. A paper is attributed to a country if the paper carries at least one address from that country. All addresses are considered, not only the address listed first. If a country appears more than once on a paper, it is counted only once for that country. All unique countries on a paper are credited equally for the paper. All citations received by a paper are credited equally to all the countries on the cited paper. No restrictions are made on the citing items in compiling the citation counts, other than that they are recorded from ISI-indexed journals only. 
